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ABSTRACT 
 
The war on terror has been continually compared to the Cold War, and in this thesis, I 
examine the speeches that mark the start of each war: Bush’s September 20, 2001, speech and 
the Truman Doctrine respectively.  Through cultural criticism and the alignment of the texts 
within the genre of crisis rhetoric, I analyze the two speeches to demonstrate how they fit into the 
genre, as well as how they create a rhetorical consciousness of the times in which they were 
given.  I use the analysis of values, ideographs, myths, and fantasy themes, as outlined by 
Roderick Hart and Suzanne Daughton, to focus my approach to cultural criticism, and each 
analysis is explicated in a different chapter.   Each chapter reveals how the incorporation of the 
specific cultural criticism approach contributes to the persuasiveness and aids in the creation of 
consciousness and crisis in Truman and Bush’s speeches.  Crisis and consciousness creation are 
the means by which rhetors set up their argument in order to persuade their audiences. Crisis 
creation creates exigence even if there is not a crisis situation and defines it if there is.  
Consciousness creation provides the rhetorical vision for the audience to interpret and respond to 
a given situation.  In order to explicate the creation of consciousness, I apply Ernest Bormann, 
John Cragan, and Donald Shields’s theory on symbolic convergence theory and the Cold War, 
and for crisis creation, I apply the three elements of the crisis rhetoric genre as outlined by 
Theodore Windt.  Both presidents’ speeches call upon theoretic, economic, social, religious, and 
political values; the ideographs of freedom, democracy, justice; identity and eschatological 
myths; and the One World, Power Politics, and Red Fascism fantasy theme rhetorical visions to 
create rhetorical consciousness and crisis among the American people.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When America was attacked on September 11, 2001, the country knew that the times had 
changed.  American civilians had never been targeted on American soil, and since Pearl Harbor 
in 1941, American soil had not been involved in conflict that came from outside its own borders.  
In the course of one day, a new America emerged, an America where the people were no longer 
safe from enemy attacks.  Americans were afraid, and Americans were in mourning for the loss 
of thousands of our fellow countrymen.  Americans were confused and had questions, and on 
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush came to us with answers.  The speech Bush gave 
defined the attacks and laid out a plan of action in response to the attacks, and it was on this day 
that America declared war on terror.  From its declaration, the war on terror has been compared 
to the Cold War due to its non-specific guidelines and open-ended policies.  America, in 2001, 
went to war against terrorism, similar to its path in 1947, when America went to war against 
communism.  While there are numerous differences between the declaration of Cold War policy 
and the war on terror, there are also too many similarities to ignore. 
 Historical and political parallels exist between the foreign policies in 1947 and in 2001; 
however, my focus is on the language that created the foundations for the Cold War and the war 
on terror.  The Truman Doctrine is the speech that was delivered by President Harry S Truman 
before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, and it is considered the start of the Cold 
War, which lasted 44 years.  President Bush’s corresponding speech given on September 20, 
2001, marks the start of the war on terror and established the foundation for a war that continues 
today.  In 2007, a mere six years after the war on terror was declared, the longevity of this war 
cannot yet be compared to that of the Cold War.  However, an analysis of the origins of each war 
through the respective speeches produces worthwhile comparisons and underscores the language 
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behind major foreign policy changes.  My intention is to examine these comparisons through the 
lens of what I call cultural crisis creation.  I use the phrase “cultural crisis creation” because in 
my examination of the two speeches, I employ a cultural critique, and through my critique, I 
display how cultural criticism informs the genre of crisis rhetoric.  I chose these two particular 
speeches for several reasons, but the primary reason is that Truman and Bush create not only 
crisis, but also cultural consciousness in their respective speeches. 
   
Selecting the Speeches 
 
The Truman Doctrine and Bush’s September 20 speech both contain elements of cultural 
and crisis creation.  The Truman Doctrine outlined President Truman’s new foreign policy, 
laying the groundwork for the American containment policy that continued for the next 44 years.  
At the time of delivery, Truman did not have the rhetoric of the Cold War available to him since 
it was during this speech that the foundation for what is labeled Cold War rhetoric was 
established, and only after this fateful speech was the term “Cold War” coined.  However, 
Truman did define the rhetorical vision that was to take shape during this time and was able to 
convince Americans that the containment of communism was necessary.  Truman, in effect, had 
to establish the current consciousness of the time and, in doing so, create a rhetorical strategy 
that would entice Americans to share in one vision.  What was needed from this speech was an 
agreement that fighting an enemy while not at war was essential to the continuation of the 
American way of life.    
On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush delivered a nationally televised 
speech before a joint session of Congress and the American people.  Nine days after the tragic 
attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush came to his audience with an identified enemy and an 
initiative for retaliation.  Bush, with resemblance to Truman in the Truman Doctrine, set out to 
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establish his administration’s future foreign policy in this crucial speech, which some scholars 
consider to be the founding moment of what came to be known by some as the Bush Doctrine.  
In this speech, Bush began laying the foundation for his terrorist containment policy that 
eventually led to the war in Iraq.  The rhetorical vision Bush employs is reminiscent of Truman’s 
in the Truman Doctrine speech since September 20th was a time of rhetorical creation as well.  
While the attacks of September 11th had united Americans, Bush still needed to create the 
rhetorical vision that would persuade his audience to support his agenda.  
  
Examining the Methods 
 
 Both Truman and Bush were faced with addressing major foreign policy changes and 
needed the support of Congress and the American people.  In order to persuade their audiences to 
support their proposals, Truman and Bush employ culturally resonant language throughout their 
speeches.  Since the American public is the primary audience for both Truman and Bush, I focus 
on the cultural criticism approaches that highlight what is common and shared among 
Americans.  A culture connects people under a collective set of values, myths, fantasies, and 
ideologies, and I consider these categories throughout the analysis that follows because of their 
widespread association within a given culture.  In Modern Rhetorical Criticism, Roderick P. Hart 
and Suzanne Daughton outline approaches to cultural criticism, and I follow the authors’ 
framework throughout the analysis that follows, which focuses on values, myths, and fantasy 
themes.  In order to further develop the analysis of values and myths, I also incorporate 
ideograph analysis, which allows for an expansion of both features. Allusions to the cultural 
features create the culturally resonant language, and through an examination of the features, I 
intend to show how Truman and Bush persuade their audiences into belief and action and, in 
doing so, create a new consciousness and create crisis.  
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Explicating Values 
 
 In chapter two, I examine the values that both Truman and Bush incorporate in their 
speeches.  Values, as defined by Hart and Daughton, are “deep-seated, persistent beliefs about 
essential rights and wrongs that express a person’s basic orientation to life” (236).  According to 
Randall K. Stutman and Sara E. Newell in their essay “Beliefs Versus Values: Salient Beliefs in 
Designing a Persuasive Message,” values differ from beliefs because “[v]alues have the 
advantage of being comparatively small in number, and, due to their abstract nature, are more 
likely to be shared by large numbers of people” (364).  Both the pervasiveness and commonality 
inherent to values, along with their accessibility since they are relatively small in number, 
prompted me to explore value analysis in my cultural critique.  Values are largely persuasive by 
nature, and are often evoked in discourse to motivate audiences; Stutman and Newell claim, 
“[…] values become particularly important if one wishes to persuade a number of people to 
action” (365).  Truman and Bush needed to persuade the majority of the American public to 
support their respective proposals, so in order to reach the largest number of people, they both 
incorporate references to values throughout their speeches.   
 To analyze the values included in Truman and Bush’s speeches, I rely on Wayne C. 
Minnick’s The Art of Persuasion, in particular the section on motivational support that includes a 
list of common American values.  Compiled from several studies and analyses on American 
values, the list Minnick generates provides a starting point for value analysis.  Minnick’s book 
was published in 1957 and again in 1968; it is the second edition of the book that I draw from, 
but since it was published 33 years before Bush’s speech and 21 years after the Truman 
Doctrine, I focus only on the most common values included in Minnick’s list that are also overtly 
present in both speeches, such as the theoretic value that “[Americans] desire to be reasonable, to 
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get the facts and make rational choices” and the economic American value that “success is the 
product of hard work and perseverance” (218).   Considering the similarities in the values that 
Truman and Bush choose to incorporate, these values were presumably in existence during 
Truman’s presidency, as well as during Bush’s.  Since Truman and Bush are trying to appeal to a 
large number of people, both rely on the most common of American values. 
 
Understanding Ideographs 
 
 Between value and myth analysis is what Michael Calvin McGee labels “ideographs,” 
and chapter three examines the use of ideographs in both speeches.  McGee states, “[h]uman 
beings are ‘conditioned,’ not directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that 
function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (6).  The vocabulary of 
concepts McGee refers to are ideographs, “one-term sums of an orientation,” which situate a 
word within its historical context (7).  Ideographs lead to the values inherent in a given text, so 
they are critical to value analysis, but ideographs differ from values in complexity since an 
ideograph can reference several values at once, as well as narrate its history.  McGee claims that 
in order to “define [an ideograph] we are forced to make reference to its history […]” (10).  The 
referencing or narrating of a history or histories of a term connects ideograph analysis to myth 
analysis.  Furthermore, ideographs “guide behavior” (McGee 15), and myths are “stories [that] 
serve as moral guides to proper action” (Hart and Daughton 242).  The incorporation of 
ideograph analysis into cultural criticism expands both value and myth analysis through this 
interconnectivity.  Additionally, ideograph analysis provides a more in-depth look into the 
ideological abstractions that “guide behavior and belief” within a culture (15).  
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Defining Myths 
 
 Myths share the same pervasive and common qualities as values, and Americans share 
many myths about our origins, identities, and future.  In chapter four, I explore the myths that 
Truman and Bush most often allude to, which are what Hart and Daughton label identity myths 
and eschatological myths (243).  Hart and Daughton define identity myths as stories that 
“explain what makes one cultural grouping different from another,” and eschatological myths as 
stories that “help a people know where they are going and what lies in store for them in the short 
run […] as well as in the long run […]” (243).  The word “eschatological” is a term loaded with 
meaning, referring to system of doctrines concerning final matters, such as death; the theology of 
the end of times; and the more Christian-specific Second Coming.  The religious implication of 
the term “eschatological” connects to the religious values incorporated in Truman and Bush’s 
speeches, and that “eschatological” references doctrines on final matters elevates the exigency in 
both speeches.  Both Truman and Bush are depicting what the potential future for America could 
be without action and then juxtaposing that future with the one that will come to be if their 
proposals are implemented.  In her essay “Preempting the Future: Rhetoric and Ideology of the 
Future in Political Discourse,” Patricia L. Dunmire states, “political actors […] constrain the 
ways the future can be imagined, articulated, and realized” (482).  Truman and Bush control the 
myths that they allude to and control their depictions of the future that America faces.  Therefore, 
they have the ability to limit the possible futures Americans imagine.  “For politicians, then,” 
Dunmire argues, “cueing the public’s view of the future is a particularly powerful means of 
influencing contemporary behavior” (483).  As for identity myths, Truman and Bush reaffirm 
what it means to be an American, as well as juxtapose American identity with the identity of the 
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respective enemy in order to create a dichotomy and heighten the sense of good versus evil and 
us versus them.  
When analyzing the myths, I investigate the stories surrounding World War II.  Both 
Truman and Bush refer to the cultural memory of Americans as heroes by alluding to the war 
victories.  Additionally, both presidents incorporate the most prevalent of American myths, 
which depicts Americans as God’s chosen people.  The allusions to this myth become important 
in creating a Manichean world of good and evil.  The myths associated with eschatology allude 
to potential attacks on American soil, nuclear war, the downfall of democracy, and the 
abolishment of freedom, all of which are associated with the end of times for America and 
potentially the rest of the world.  
 
Expanding Fantasy Themes 
 
 All of the cultural criticism approaches combine under fantasy theme analysis in chapter 
five.  In Ernest Bormann, John Cragan, and Donald Shields’s essay “An Expansion of the 
Rhetorical Vision Component of the Symbolic Convergence Theory: The Cold War Paradigm 
Case,” the scholars explicate the rhetorical visions employed during the Cold War.  They argue 
that “[…] three streams of rhetorical consciousness characterize the life cycle of rhetorical 
visions: consciousness creating, consciousness raising, and consciousness sustaining” (2).  Both 
Truman and Bush’s speeches are in the consciousness-creating phase of rhetorical visions and 
incorporate the three rhetorical visions that the authors outline: One World, which depicts a 
unified world working together; Power Politics, which depicts countries competing for their own 
interests; and Red Fascism, which depicts a diabolical struggle between the good and evil forces 
in the world (2-6).  Bormann, Cragan, and Shields state that “[c]onsciousness-creating 
communication involves the sharing of fantasies to generate new symbolic ground for a 
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community of people” (2).  And values, ideographs, and myths help shape the new rhetorical 
vision during this phase in combination with the existing rhetorical visions.  The evocation of 
values and the allusions to ideographs and myths are the cultural elements that elevate 
persuasiveness and exigence, but the rhetorical visions in fantasy themes bind all the cultural 
elements together to create a cultural consciousness in both speeches. 
 
Connecting Crisis Creation and Cultural Criticism 
 
 In combination with the cultural creation that unfolds in the following chapters, I apply 
the genre of crisis rhetoric to Truman and Bush’s speeches.  Theodore Windt, in his essay “The 
Presidency and Speeches on International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past,” discusses the 
speech genres common to all Presidents (125).  The particular genre Windt focuses on is crisis 
rhetoric, and he examines the three elements that define the genre: 
First, The President tells the people that a dangerous new situation exists that 
requires that he act decisively.  Second, he states that this new situation is only 
one more in an ongoing greater battle between incompatible ideologies.  Finally, 
he calls for the public to realize that the enactment of his policy and support for it 
are moral acts. (132) 
Evidence of these three elements is prominent in my analysis of values and fantasy themes, but 
can also be seen in the chapters on ideographs and myths.  In fact, cultural criticism lends itself 
readily to the genre of crisis rhetoric in both speeches, and the two methods inform and expand 
one another.  The genre of crisis rhetoric gives cultural critics the focused direction of exploring 
the three elements that make up the genre when examining the cultural features of a text.  And 
cultural criticism gives crisis rhetoric critics the means to incorporate more than just an analysis 
that investigates whether or not the three elements exist, but also how they are presented, 
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whether or not the crisis creation is convincing, and how it is effective or ineffective.  What is 
lacking in the analysis of the crisis rhetoric genre is not what the President does, but how he 
accomplishes it, and it is the means to discover whether the President is successful or not that 
cultural analysis can underscore.   
 
Exploring the Truman Doctrine and Bush’s September 20, 2001 speech through cultural 
criticism or crisis rhetoric singularly would provide a glimpse into the foundation-laying 
elements in the speeches.  However, by combining the two approaches, the intricate cultural 
references display how consciousness is altered and how crisis is effectively created.   Through 
the explication of common American values, such as the American desire to obtain all of the 
facts in order to make reasonable decisions and the analysis of ideographs (Minnick 218), the 
connections between what Americans value and the elements of crisis rhetoric begin to unfold.  
Further investigation into identity and eschatological myths expounds upon the depictions 
involved to raise exigency to crisis creation.  And with the inclusion of fantasy theme rhetorical 
visions, values, ideographs, and myths connect to form one rhetorical vision that influences 
consciousness and creates crisis.    Both Truman and Bush needed to convince the American 
public that their proposals were the best course of action, and by incorporating crisis rhetoric in 
combination with cultural features, both successfully initiated new foreign policies.   
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VALUE EVALUATIONS 
 
Value analysis can help scholars understand the value system within a given culture, 
therefore, representing a component of cultural criticism that helps to further investigate the 
beliefs a culture often possesses without awareness.  When values are incorporated into 
language, the language becomes persuasive since values are fundamental and do not change 
easily.  Value analysis can relate to an individual because “[e]ach person […] has unique 
values,” or to a large group of people because “he also has a set of shared values that he holds in 
common with others in his culture” (Minnick 215).  Stutman and Newell state, “[w]hile many 
people have different and conflicting views of a particular situation, they may still have one or 
two relevant values in common to which a speaker may appeal” (365).  Rhetors are attracted to 
the use of values because of their commonness and their ability to appeal to large groups of 
people.  Although “the simple invocation of a particular value is seldom enough to predict or 
lead to action,” their presence can aid in presenting arguments (Stutman and Newell 365).  In 
fact, rhetors often use values to present an argument that appears logical, but is more based in 
pathos than logos. When an argument has enough value-rich language, it can appear to be a 
logical deduction of the information because of the emotional content of values, and rhetors 
often use values to establish arguments that cannot be rationally created without the appeal to 
pathos.  
Values can be difficult to distinguish from one another because the majority of values 
contain many similarities.  Even though, Wayne C. Minnick lays out categories for values in The 
Art of Persuasion, his list still overlaps in places.  Therefore, when determining which value 
Truman or Bush evokes in any particular section of text, I consider that more than one value and 
even more than one cultural feature may be evoked or alluded to.  By acknowledging when the 
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value appeals intersect, I intend to highlight the continuity in the evocation of values in the two 
speeches.  Both presidents incorporate what Minnick refers to as theoretic, economic, social, 
religious, and political values.  The theoretic values Minnick lists focus on how Americans prefer 
to receive information, as well as the American view of education; the economic values relate to 
the American perception of success, wealth, and work; the social values concern that which 
Americans desire in our different relationships; the religious values reflect how Americans 
interpret moral acts; and the political values reveal Americans’ connection to the American 
government and how it is operated.  I have aligned Truman and Bush’s common value use to 
underscore the relation of these two texts in their content and their crisis creation.         
In 1947, President Truman had an initiative to present to Congress and the American 
people, and among the many rhetorical devices he uses in his speech, value evoking is the most 
prevalent.  Nearly every sentence contains a direct reference or an allusion to a core American 
value.  Truman relies on the use of values to help create exigence.  Without the urgency Truman 
depicts in his speech and the value-based presentation, he may not have been able to establish a 
crisis situation that warranted immediate action and a complete change in foreign policy 
procedures.  Conversely, President Bush did not have to create a situation that warranted strong, 
value-laden language because of the attacks on September 11th a crisis situation already existed; 
however, the existence of crisis situation does not necessarily determine the rhetoric that follows.  
Bush was still faced with the rhetorical decision of how to define the attack, and how to structure 
America’s response.  After the attacks, Americans and people across the globe were honoring 
our tragedy, and the images of Americans and the world uniting created an opportunity for Bush 
to reference our core values to meet his ends.  After the attacks, the American people and the 
world were waiting to see how America would respond, and Bush responded with a speech in the 
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genre of crisis rhetoric exemplified by core American values.  Both presidents use value-laden 
language because they both had a foreign policy agenda to present, and as Stutman and Newell 
state, “[j]ustification and motivation for action come from shared beliefs and values” (362).  
Therefore, in order for Truman and Bush to convince Congress and the American people that 
action must be taken and that America’s foreign policy needed altering, they relied on values for 
the justification and motivation for change. 
 
The Facts 
 
Values are prevalent in both speeches, and even the structures are appeals to American 
values.  Both Truman and Bush use theoretic values to set up their speeches in order to create the 
illusion of logos while still grounding their discourse in value-based language.  Truman begins, 
“[t]he gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before 
a joint session of the Congress.”  In the first line of his speech, Truman begins his crisis creation 
because he is claiming “control over the facts of the situation and [acknowledging] that the New 
Facts which occasion the speech constitute a New Situation […],” which is the first element of 
crisis rhetoric (Windt 128).  By stating that he knows about the situation that exists and that the 
situation is grave, Truman asserts “New Facts” and a “New Situation” (128).  Additionally, 
Truman appeals to American theoretic values in this first line, as well as throughout the speech.  
Minnick’s list of theoretic values focuses on how Americans prefer to receive information, as 
well as how Americans perceive education.  More specifically, Minnick claims, “[Americans] 
express a desire to be reasonable, to get the facts and make rational choices” (218).  Truman is 
giving his audience facts, or at least presenting the situation in terms of facts.  The fact is that the 
situation is grave or else Truman would not be speaking with Congress.  By establishing this 
value-based logic that is presented as simple reason from the start, Truman creates reasoning that 
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appeals to the American people’s theoretic values.  The speech continues with Truman 
presenting the facts of the new situation to his audience in order to create a crisis and to provoke 
an emotional response to the information given.     
When describing the state of postwar Greece, Truman states: 
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans 
had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, 
and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five 
percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had 
almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of 
these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, 
was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery 
impossible.   
This entire section is an appeal to the theoretic value of Americans desiring facts in order to 
make rational decisions (Minnick 218).  Truman lists the facts that confront Greece: “Germans 
had destroyed everything,” so the American people can make a reasoned decision on how to 
proceed with the information given.  However, even in his presentation of the facts, Truman 
incorporates language saturated with pathos as the above quote shows with phrases such as 
“exploiting human want and misery.”  Because of the inclusion of pathos and the theoretic value 
appeal, rationality does not necessarily have to exist in Truman’s language, but only appear to 
exist since the emotional and value-based appeals override reasoned thought.  And because of 
the strong value-based appeal, Truman can present the situation in Greece and Turkey as if the 
facts given lead to only one rational choice: extending aid.   
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Furthermore, Truman’s apparent knowledge of the situation and the presentation of that 
knowledge to his audience lead to additional appeals to the American theoretic value focusing on 
reasonable decisions.  Truman continues establishing the facts: Greece has “suffered invasion.”  
And Greece is without materials that “are indispensable for the subsistence of its people […].”  
Proceeding in this way, Truman creates a theoretic value basis for giving aid to Greece and 
Turkey by establishing their need and providing a reasonable solution.   
Toward the end of the speech, the theoretic appeals increase to portray rationality and 
logic in Truman’s proposal.  Minnick states that Americans “respect common sense” and “prefer 
[…] to use traditional approaches to problems” (218).  Truman provides a traditional solution in 
giving aid to both countries, an approach that he mentions is already being used to rebuild 
European nations after the war.  In addition to monetary aid, Truman suggests that “[i]t is only 
common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.”  
Appealing to practicality, Americans can see with all the facts laid out that the decision to give 
aid, provide training, and oversee how the aid is used is the rational choice because of the 
theoretic value-based presentation of the facts and subsequent traditional resolution. 
Comparable to Truman, President Bush appeals to the American preference of using 
“traditional approaches to problems, or means that have been tried previously” (Minnick 218).  
Bush chooses war to define the September 11 attacks because, as he states, “Americans have 
known wars.”  In David Zarefsky’s “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” he 
comments that “[n]aming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and determining the 
appropriate response” (611).  Furthermore, Zarefsky claims, “[…] the president, by defining a 
situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the 
public” (611).  Therefore, President Bush’s choice to define the attacks of September 11th as acts 
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of war aided in shaping how the American public viewed the events and also aided in shaping 
the response or the willingness to go along with Bush’s suggested response. 
Familiarity with war and its definition, appeals to the American theoretic value of 
desiring the use of “traditional approaches” (Minnick 218).  Furthermore, as many scholars have 
noted, calling the attacks of September 11th “an act of war against our country” was a rhetorical 
choice by the President that allows Bush to establish a form of logic for his speech, which, like 
Truman’s logic, is more based in pathos than logos.  The war definition functions as a rhetorical 
choice because in labeling the attacks acts of war, Bush “makes no explicit argument,” and 
Zarefsky argues that definition lacks the need for argument but frames the situation in such a 
way that no argument is required (611).  Bush highlights the emotional elements of war when he 
states: 
Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on 
foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties 
of war – but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.  Americans 
have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All of 
this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a 
world where freedom itself is under attack. 
By presenting war as a surprise attack on American soil, Bush draws on the emotions 
surrounding the attacks of September 11th instead of outlining a logic-based narrative of the 
events.   
However, Bush does not neglect the American “desire to be reasonable, to get the facts 
and make rational choices” (Minnick 218).  This theoretic value connects to the rhetorical choice 
of war since with the war definition, Bush can logically respond with military action.  The fact, 
 16
according to Bush, is that “enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.”  
And since the fact is that the attack on September 11th was an act of war, Americans can start 
making rational decisions that revolve around the normal course of action when war is involved.  
Therefore, Bush can suggest that America respond with military action, and the response fits the 
war definition and appeals to American theoretic values.   
 Once Bush has classified the attacks as war, he continues to outline facts in order to lend 
credibility to the remainder of his proposal.  For nine days, Americans were theorizing over who 
was behind the attacks on September 11th, and for nine days, no formal statement had come from 
the administration.  However, on September 20th, Bush clearly defined America’s attackers, 
presenting the findings in a factual manner: “The evidence we have gathered all points to a 
collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.”  By showing that 
research had been conducted, Bush appeals to the American desire “to get the facts and make 
rational choices” (Minnick 218).  Now that America knows the attacks were acts of war and who 
was behind the attacks, it can start piecing these facts together and formulating a plan.  
Through further defining al Qaeda, Bush continues to explain the facts that have been 
determined.  And by building on facts of the organization and its members, namely Osama bin 
Laden, he shows that the American administration and intelligence has uncovered the mystery 
surrounding September 11th, and that Americans can now start making “rational choices” 
(Minnick 218).  Bush presents the information in a manner that is appealing and convincing to 
America: here are the facts and here is the course of action that these facts necessitate, and since 
it was an act of war, these facts necessitate war. 
While leaving out the methods that were used to uncover who was behind the attacks, 
Bush definitively states that al Qaeda is to blame, much in same way he defined the attacks as 
 17
war by simply stating it.  He continues to define who al Qaeda is with an analogy, asserting, “Al 
Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime.”  Bush uses a well-known organization in America, 
the mafia, in order to appeal to Americans’ theoretic value of preferring “traditional approaches” 
(Minnick 218).  Through the mafia metaphor, Bush is attempting to familiarize America with its 
new enemy and, in turn, provide an approach with which the American people will be 
comfortable.  Yet at the same time, he establishes an argument that presents a complication in 
fighting the new enemy much in the same way America has had difficulty combating the mafia.  
Bush is preparing Americans for a complex and mysterious war that cannot be fought by 
traditional means alone.  Additionally, he outlines the expectations that Americans should have 
for this war: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other 
we have ever seen.”  Therefore, while appealing to the American theoretic value of using 
“traditional approaches to problems” (Minnick 218), much like the criminal justice system 
approaches the mafia, Bush negates the value simultaneously since traditional approaches my not 
be efficient in fighting America’s new enemies.  The complication with employing traditional 
approaches and the potential inability to do so leaves Americans with a challenge to overcome, 
which appeals to American social and economic values of achievement and success (Minnick 
218-219).  Even though Bush cannot maintain a completely traditional and familiar outline for 
the war to come, he is able to appeal to other values even when complicating one. 
Throughout the September 20 speech, Bush is in “control over the facts of the situation 
and [acknowledges] that the New Facts which occasion the speech constitute a New Situation 
[…]” (Windt 128).  The appeals to theoretic values contribute to this element of crisis rhetoric, 
which Windt claims is how “speeches about international crises begin” (128).  Not only does 
Bush begin his speech by stating the facts of the situation, but he also carries out his knowledge 
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of the facts through definition during the first half of the speech.  By defining the attacks, 
defining al Qaeda, and defining the new war, Bush operates within the genre of crisis rhetoric 
while simultaneously creating appeals to American values. 
When appealing to theoretic values, both Truman and Bush rely on the same two values: 
facts leading to rational choices and familiarity with approaches to problems (Minnick 218).  By 
presenting their proposals using these two values to help structure and support their agendas, 
Truman and Bush give the illusion that the President is in command of the facts and knows how 
to proceed with them.  Knowing the information and knowing what the information entails 
contributes to presidential ethos in crisis rhetoric.  Windt claims, “people believe that the 
President has superior information and knowledge about national affairs” (127).  Therefore, 
when the President, be it Truman or Bush or any other past, present, or future president, provides 
the American people with information, we believe it to be fact since he has superior knowledge.  
 
Money and Success 
 
While the ethos of the presidency lends credibility to the facts Truman and Bush present, 
both presidents incorporate appeals to various other values as well.  Considering that Truman 
was asking for $400 million from Americans in order to aid Greece and Turkey and Bush was 
setting up the grounds for a long-lasting, unfamiliar war, both presidents integrate economic 
values to aid their economic ends and to further persuade Americans to accept their agendas as a 
whole.   
 Americans were recently out of a severe economic depression in 1947, and the memory 
of economic struggle was still fresh in the minds of Americans.  Even though Truman makes no 
direct allusions to the Depression, that cultural memory exists in his audience.  Therefore, 
Truman uses American memory to his advantage by depicting an image of a down-struck Greek 
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nation and presenting the opportunity to rescue Turkey before it suffers the same fate.  Working 
within the economic values of Americans, where “Americans measure success chiefly by 
economic means […] and Americans think everyone should aspire and have the opportunity to 
get rich,” Truman grounds his proposal by illustrating Greece’s economic state and claiming that 
Turkey is soon to follow Greece’s unfortunate path (Minnick 218).  One of the first reasons 
Truman provides as motivation to assist Greece is that “Greece is not a rich country.”  By 
presenting Greece as a country that lacks economic achievement, Truman is appealing to 
Americans’ measure of success, and implying that since Greece is not a rich country, it should 
have the opportunity to get rich.   
Truman continues his speech stating that “[l]ack of sufficient natural resources has 
always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet.”  This statement portrays 
a hard working nation that cannot seem to get ahead, which is important since Americans would 
be less willing to help a shiftless nation.  And picturing a struggling country in need of guidance 
appeals directly to American economic values because “[Americans] think success is the product 
of hard work and perseverance” (Minnick 218).  Therefore, Truman emphasizes the Greek 
people’s work ethic.   By continuing to construct an image of a struggling nation of hard working 
people who seem to have met defeat at every turn, Truman puts the emphasis on Greece and 
Turkey’s struggles and off the fact that he is asking for $400 million from Americans. 
While Truman uses economic appeals to connect Americans with the circumstances that 
face Greece and Turkey, Bush uses appeals to economic values to exemplify the state of the 
union after the attacks of September 11th.  In order to emphasize America’s economic strength, 
Bush states: 
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Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity.  They did not touch its 
source.  America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and 
enterprise of our people.  These were the true strengths of our economy before 
September 11th, and they are our strengths today. 
The World Trade Center was symbolic of economic progress, and Bush reaffirms America’s 
economic power by declaring that buildings are symbols and may not last, but American values 
cannot be destroyed.  Throughout the speech, Bush stresses that the terrorists were unable to 
shake the foundation of America, and in the above quote, he emphasizes that American 
economic successes are not material and, therefore, remain in the wake of September 11th.  
According to Bush, Americans saw “the endurance of rescuers, working past 
exhaustion,” which is proof that the terrorists did not touch our values because even in the face 
of tragedy Americans persevere.  And Americans, according to Minnick, value “hard work and 
perseverance” (218).  Moreover, Bush makes it clear that although America did suffer an 
economic hardship, “We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America’s 
economy, and put our people back to work.”  While America is facing an economic struggle, 
Bush focuses on strengthening American confidence by appealing to America’s ability to rebuild 
itself through commitment and hard work.  Additionally, Bush appeals to America’s 
perseverance when he states, “our resolve must not pass.”  As stated above, Bush is preparing the 
American people for a new war, and in doing so, he must appeal to our values in order to show 
what it will take from the people to succeed in this war, and Americans definitely value success.  
  
Honesty and Hard Work 
 
 The particular economic value that “success is the product of hard work and 
perseverance” relates to Minnick’s social values as well (218).  Social values focus on what it 
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takes to be accepted by American society, and “hard work and perseverance,” while clearly an 
economic value, is interrelated to social values since being a hard worker is socially valued: 
“[Americans] should want to get ahead and be willing to work hard at it” (219).   
 In order to convince Americans that the Greek people were worthy of aid, Truman aligns 
American social values with those of Greece and Turkey.  As in his appeal to economic values, 
Truman cannot depict Greece as a shiftless country that is looking for a hand out, so he states 
that the “[l]ack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard 
to make both ends meet.”  Additionally, Truman describes Greece as “industrious.”  Both of 
these depictions present a Greek nation wanting to get ahead, working hard at it, but still meeting 
defeat.  The defeat that Greece has met cannot be presented as its own fault or Americans will be 
unsympathetic, so Truman is sure to state that “Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, 
roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine.”  By claiming that the Germans are 
responsible and not the Greek people, Truman can successfully appeal to the social value of 
working hard to get ahead since without enemy occupation, Truman insinuates, Greece would be 
thriving. 
 The depiction of enemy occupation also appeals to the American social value of “fairness 
and justice” (Minnick 219).  Americans respect these qualities, and Truman appeals to this social 
value by showing that Greece has not been treated fairly or justly.  Greece, Truman states, “has 
suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.”  According to 
Truman, the fact that Greece is suffering, through no fault of its own, is unjust.  However, 
Truman also appeals directly to Americans because he is presenting an opportunity for the 
country to display its fairness and justice by aiding Greece and Turkey and, therefore, be 
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admired.  Truman extends American values onto the Greek people, but he also appeals to the 
vanity of Americans and the desire to be seen as fair and just.  
 Similar to Truman, Bush also appeals to the American desire to be seen as fair and just.  
However, the first mention of the fair and just social values in Bush’s speech depicts a fair and 
just retaliation to the attack on America.  He states, “[w]hether we bring our enemies to justice, 
or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done,” showing that the American value of justice 
is at stake and will be met.  According to Minnick’s social values, Americans “admire […] 
justice,” and Bush uses American vanity and the desire to be seen as just to aid in his proposal by 
claiming that “justice will be done.”  Bush wants America and the world to know that this 
cherished value will be met, and the terrorists that attacked America will not get away 
unpunished.  Bush outlines the threat of justice in any form, which appeals to the American 
desire for retribution under the veil of justice when threatened or attacked.  And by naming the 
attacks an act of war, Bush creates a fair and just retaliation of declaring war against our enemies 
and bringing them to justice. 
Truman and Bush additionally evoke the social value that “Americans think that people 
should be honest, sincere, kind, generous, friendly, and straightforward” (219).  In an effort to 
persuade their audiences, both Truman and Bush present themselves and their proposals using 
the qualities of friendship, sincerity, kindness, generosity, and honesty and straightforwardness, 
which contribute to their ethos.  Since Americans value these qualities, the President should 
exude these qualities, and both Truman and Bush do so throughout their speeches. 
To appeal to the social value of friendship, Bush displays a united world community, 
referring to specific nations that have shown America support: Britain, France, Germany, South 
Korea, and Egypt, among others.  Throughout his speech, Bush uses the word “friend” or a 
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derivation of it six times to distinguish “those who are with us” from those who are enemies.  
Even though these friends may not in fact be with America in every decision, a social polarity is 
being created, consisting of those who align with American values and those who do not.  By 
listing America’s friends, Bush also portrays America as “a good mixer, able to get along well 
with other people” (Minnick 219).  Americans value relationships, and Bush is careful to attempt 
to unite America with other countries.  Americans want to be revered as “able to get along with 
other people,” so Bush extends this value to include the country itself, where America makes 
friends and lasting relationships with other countries.     
As mentioned above, Bush refers to his friends and, by extension, America’s friends 
throughout his speech.  If Bush has so many friends, then he must be a friendly man, contributing 
to his ethos and his ability to relate to the American public.  Both Bush and Truman present 
themselves as men of the people.  Truman was actually one of the first presidents to speak for the 
people’s understanding and was criticized for his use of plain language. However, now it is 
necessary for a president to be able to communicate clearly with the American public in terms 
we can all understand.   
Unlike Bush, Truman does not use the word “friend” or a derivation thereof in his 
speech, but he does present a community of what could be considered friends for democratic 
countries, and he appeals to the value of friendship as a reason to support his agenda.  Truman 
uses adjectives to describe Greece such as “self-supporting,” “self-respecting,” “peace loving,” 
and “democratic” to align its interests with those of America.  By aligning Greece with America, 
Truman creates a bond between the two countries, so when he states, “the Greek Government 
has asked for our aid […],” Truman presents an opportunity for America to be a good friend and 
help out a fellow country, appealing to the desire of Americans to be seen as good friends.       
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As for the qualities of being “sincere, kind, [and] generous,” Bush relies on them to 
remind Americans of the values we possess and display, but Truman widely incorporates them to 
build American support for helping other countries in their time of need (Minnick 219).  Truman 
is asking Americans to extend these qualities that we value and generously help two countries 
that cannot help themselves.  Toward the end of the speech, Truman states, “[t]he free peoples of 
the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.”  This statement references 
American social values because now is the opportunity for Americans to show the world that we 
are “sincere, kind, [and above all] generous” (Minnick 219).     
To reassure Americans that he is considering their values, Bush focuses more on how 
Americans have displayed sincerity, kindness, and generosity.  In the beginning of his speech, he 
gives examples of heroic American acts: “[w]e have seen it in the courage of passengers, who 
rushed terrorists to save others on the ground.” Bush also illustrates these values in his continual 
depiction of Americans joining together to defend ourselves and the rest of the world: “[o]ur 
nation, this generation will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future.  We will 
rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage.”  Americans, Bush asserts throughout 
the speech, are sincere, kind, and generous enough to give up our own lives for others whether 
they are Americans or friends of Americans.  Bush aims to remind Americans that we still 
possess these qualities, have shown them to the world, and will continue to show them to the 
world.  
By presenting the situation and then leading up to the action being requested, Truman 
creates an arrangement of the facts that leads to a common sense, rational decision, which 
appeals to American theoretic values.  However, in his presentation, he appeals to honesty and 
straightforwardness since he appears to be giving his audience all the information at his disposal.  
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There is no clear indication that Truman is hiding information, but instead, he is laying it all out 
for the public to see.  This illusion is imperative for Truman to persuade the audience that his 
recommendation of aid is the most effective means to address the situation since Americans 
prefer to get all the facts before making decisions.  The section of the Truman Doctrine that most 
clearly evokes the values of honesty and straightforwardness occurs when Truman acknowledges 
Greece’s faults: 
The Greek Government is not perfect. […] The Greek Government has been 
operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism.  It has made mistakes.  The 
extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones 
everything that the Greek Government has done or will do.  [What] [w]e have 
condemned in the past, we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the 
left.  We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.   
This section of the speech displays Truman’s apparent honesty about the Greek government’s 
past and present, as well as his straightforwardness about America’s stance toward the Greek 
governmental policies.   
 A few minutes later Truman states, “I am fully aware of the broad implication involved if 
the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications 
with you at this time.”  Here Truman asserts his command over the situation, but also shows 
Americans that he is knowledgeable and willing to be open and honest about the situation.  
Truman incorporates his ethos in combination with audience desire, allowing for a comradeship 
to take place, in which Truman is confiding in the people by sharing his knowledge.   
Comparable to Truman, Bush also confides in the American public through a sharing of 
information.  Incorporating honesty and straightforwardness, Bush outlines who the enemy is, 
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how America will proceed, and speaks directly to several audiences.  The presentation of the 
facts establishing who attacked America shows honesty with the American people since the 
government is not hiding its findings, but sharing and explaining them to the people.  Further, 
stating facts such as, “[w]omen are not allowed to attend school,” allows Bush to show a fact, 
which in turn shows honesty, but also presents a statement loaded with pathos since Americans 
value equal education (Minnick 218).  Here again the theoretic value of fact stating and the 
social value of honesty and straightforwardness are combined for maximum value effect.   
Other than stating facts in an honest and straightforward manner, Bush displays these 
qualities when he addresses the world and specifically the Taliban: 
Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in 
your land.  Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have 
unjustly imprisoned.  Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in 
your country.  Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp 
in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support 
structure, to appropriate authorities.  Give the United States full access to terrorist 
training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.   
There is no confusion here as to what America is demanding of the Taliban; Bush outlines 
America’s expectations clearly and thoughtfully and is upfront with our enemies on where 
America stands.  This upfront approach is highlighted by Bush directly addressing the Taliban, 
and then grounded further in Bush switching in the next line to address the American people: 
“The Taliban must act, and act immediately.  They will hand over the terrorists, or they will 
share in their fate.”  At this point in the speech, Bush is grounding what his intentions are in a 
manner that is valued by Americans because he is matter of fact in his address.  
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God and Morality 
 
In connection with the American social value of generosity lies the religious value that 
“Americans are charitable.  They feel sympathy for the poor and the unfortunate and are ready to 
offer material help” (Minnick 220).  Truman relies on the charity of Americans to ground his 
request for aid, but Bush focuses on other religious values such as believing “that one should be 
tolerant of other religions” (220).  The circumstances surrounding the two speeches create 
different situations for each president to address; therefore, Truman and Bush approach their 
agendas with a focus on varying types of religious values.  However, both presidents still rely 
heavily on religious values, and both agendas are ultimately headed in similar directions.     
Throughout Truman’s speech, he calls upon the charity in Americans, claiming that 
Greece has “suffered,” their “children were tubercular,” “they sacrificed,” and their means of 
survival “had almost disappeared.”  Creating a desperate, distraught country evokes the good 
will in Americans, the need to assist those less fortunate.  But Truman is careful to mention 
continuously that what Greece needs is material assistance: “Greece is in desperate need of 
financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel, and 
seeds.”  Truman is not asking the American people to nurse Greece back to economic security, 
but to provide them with goods and the means to obtain goods.  By presenting countries in need 
of assistance that cannot help themselves and asking for material aid for Greece and Turkey, 
Truman effectively evokes charitable American values. 
 Additionally, Truman creates a moral situation by establishing a destitute country and 
then reasoning that the U.S. is the only country that can help: “There is no other country to which 
democratic Greece can turn.” Establishing this moral dilemma along with the charity value 
allows Truman to create his argument and make it seem immoral to deny aid to either country.  If 
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Americans truly are the only people who can save Greece and Turkey from ruin, then the choice 
becomes a resolution without options.  By the end of his speech, Truman has extended his 
argument past merely aiding Greece and Turkey to incorporate the rest of the world’s fate, 
including America.  At which point, the moral decision becomes more potent because if 
Americans do not make the right choice and aid these countries, “we may endanger the peace of 
the world.  And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.”  Truman is counting on the 
strength of American values, and he builds upon those values until the emotional appeals to 
morality and charity appear to be decisions based on logical reasoning: if America does not lend 
aid to Greece and Turkey, America will be in danger of losing its freedoms. 
While all of the values Bush uses are helpful to his agenda and persuasive, none is more 
frequently used in his speech than that of religion.  Minnick states that “[Americans] think 
religion and politics should not be mixed […] [and] politicians [should stay] out of religious 
matters” (220).  And while keeping politics separate from religion is still valued in America, 
Bush’s September 20 speech is laden with religious references.  President Bush is one of, if not 
the most, openly and vocally religious of all the American presidents.  He has been both 
criticized and praised for his religious language, but during this speech he was able to find a 
balance that appealed to the majority of Americans’ religious values.  By sparingly referring to 
Christianity and Judaism, Bush is seeking to appeal to what could be seen as American religion, 
which is non-specific, but God believing. 
In the beginning of his speech and near the end, Bush refers to prayer.  At first he briefly 
mentions that “[w]e’ve seen […] the saying of prayers – in English, Hebrew, and Arabic.”  Then 
later, “Prayer,” as Bush states, “has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the 
journey ahead.”  So prayer functions as something to unite the world and a soothing way to cope 
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with tragedy in the beginning of the speech, and by the end, prayer will additionally see America 
through in the war.  In both depictions, prayer is working for America, and establishing this 
order of logic allows Bush to put America on the side with God because if prayer will help 
America, then God must be listening to American prayers.   Bush further grounds America on 
the side of God by claiming that “[f]reedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at 
war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.”  The logic that follows this statement 
is that God is on freedom’s side, justice’s side, America’s side.  Clearly, Bush is not staying out 
of religious matters.  In fact, he is making this war a religious war with the American values of 
freedom and justice as good and with God and our enemies’ values of fear and cruelty as evil and 
against God.   
Because of this religious dichotomy that Bush creates, he distinctly delineates between 
Muslims and the Islamic extremists he identifies as our enemy: “[t]he enemy of America is not 
our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends.  Our enemy is a radical network of 
terrorists […].”  By making these distinctions, Bush is able to appease the American religious 
value that “one should be tolerant of other religions” (220).  After all, one of America’s freedoms 
is the freedom of religion, and to label all Muslims as the enemy would directly conflict with 
America’s core freedom value system. 
Not only is Bush creating a religious conflict, but he is also preparing for a moral battle.  
War, as America defines it, is fought with the military, but our amoral enemies have a “directive 
[that] commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinctions 
among military and civilians, including women and children.”  This statement outlines the 
parameters of the amoral war waging of America’s enemies.  Since “[Americans] tend to judge 
people and events moralistically” (Minnick 220), Bush presents a moral conflict between 
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America and its enemies to further establish a means of American superiority supporting his 
Manichean world of good and evil.  Furthermore, the above quote from Bush’s speech is laden 
with pathos such as the inclusion of “women and children,” which additionally convinces 
Americans of the amoral status of our new enemies.  
  
The Good and the Evil 
 
Through religious values, Bush begins to establish the conflict between good and evil.  
The other values both Bush and Truman incorporate function primarily to persuade the American 
public through pathos, but the religious values for Bush, and the political values for both 
presidents start to go beyond persuasion into enemy creation.  The second element of crisis 
rhetoric, according to Windt, is the creation of melodrama “between Good and Evil, between 
pure motives and sinister motives” (131).  And while to some extent all the value evoking in both 
speeches contributes to the development of “pure motives” in Americans, the creation of the 
polarity between America and its enemies becomes clearer in the appeals to religious and 
political values.   
The Truman Doctrine actually created the language and the enemy used to define the 
second element of Windt’s crisis rhetoric.  Since his article was published in 1973 in the middle 
of the Cold War, Windt examines speeches that have a clear communist enemy.  The Truman 
Doctrine and the values it relies upon helped establish Minnick’s list of American values.  Since 
Minnick compiled the list in the 1960s, many of the values are reflective of the Cold War, 
especially the political values.  However, Minnick’s list is a compilation of value research that 
extends well before 1947, so the values he lists cannot be ignored or discredited simply because 
they were not published until the 1960s. 
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In 1947, America and the allies had just defeated the enemy in World War II, and 
America had recently brought itself out of economic depression, which left Americans confident 
in their government and in democracy as a whole.  Truman alludes to the recent success of 
Americans to establish grounds for spreading democracy against totalitarian regimes, in 
particular, communists.  
 Stressing from the beginning Greece as a free nation that is at risk to lose its freedom, 
Truman captures the most fundamental American value: freedom.  Above all else, America 
prides itself on freedom and its struggles to achieve and maintain freedom, so by incorporating 
this value, Truman can align Greece with American values to influence America to help a fellow 
free nation.  Truman proceeds, referring to Greece as a “peace loving country” that was a victim 
of the war and highlighting how the allies or “forces of liberation” previously fought to regain 
Greece’s freedom.   In order for Truman to successfully persuade his audience, he must first 
establish Greece as a country that upholds American values, depicting a free nation that desires 
peace and needs to be saved.  Then he can construct an enemy who is a threat to these values.   
Truman’s dichotomous identity construction begins when he describes the people who 
invaded Greece as “several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the 
government’s authority […].”  Here, Truman is depicting defiant invaders who have no respect 
for Greece’s freedom and political system, and he is aligning the enemy from World War II with 
the enemy that threatens Greece two years after the war has ended.  Truman depicts an invasion 
much like the invasions Americans fought during the war only a few years prior, and by 
conjuring Americans’ war memory, Truman creates a vision of struggle that the American 
people do not want to revisit. 
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Freedom is not the only American political value that Truman evokes; he also relies 
heavily on democracy to align Greek values with American values.  Americans believe in 
democracy, and Minnick claims that “[Americans] think American democracy is the best of all 
possible governments” (220).  Therefore, in his speech, Truman references democracy and 
“democratic Greece” throughout.  Truman elects to allude consistently to the fragility of 
Greece’s democratic standing as if democracy itself was at stake: “The peoples of a number of 
countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their 
will.”  Furthermore, Truman asserts in a number of places that democracy as a whole is at risk if 
America does not aid Greece: “[c]ollapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be 
disastrous not only for them but for the world.”  Americans have recently witnessed the struggles 
of European invasions and fought against totalitarianism, and Truman is connecting these 
struggles to an ongoing battle with democratic Greece as the front line.  He presents the nation 
with a choice, a choice to allow democratic Greece to fall into the hands of a totalitarian regime 
or to fight for democracy: “At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life.”  These “alternatives” are alternate to democracy and 
freedom and, therefore, against American political values and the American way of life. 
Americans, Minnick states, “think the American way of doing things is better than 
foreign ways” (219).   So with Americans valuing the American way, Truman projects a future 
where America itself is subject to collapse, a world where “[s]hould we fail to aid Greece and 
Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.”  By 
helping Greece, Truman claims, Americans are preserving the continuation of our way of 
governing.   
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Bush also appeals to the American way of doing things. Knowing that “[Americans] 
think the American way of doing things is better than the foreign way” allows Bush to use 
political values to further lend pathos-laden logic to his proposal and set up a distinction between 
America and its enemies (Minnick 220).  Throughout the speech, Bush references what 
Americans do: “The United States respects the people of Afghanistan.”  Therefore, since 
Americans respect Afghanistan’s people, Americans would not cause them undue harm, unlike 
our enemies, who do not respect the people of America and would cause them undue harm.  
Following this logic, America conducts itself morally and politically better than its foreign 
enemy.  Additionally, if the American way of doing things is better, then America can decide for 
itself the best course of action without waiting for the support of the United Nations.  While this 
sentiment is not directly stated, Bush makes it clear by consistently using the pronoun “we,” by 
reminding his audience that America was attacked, and by stating, “either you are with us, or you 
are with the terrorists.”  
 Through the use of us-versus-them language, Bush creates an enemy that is against 
freedom and against democracy.  Building on the importance of democracy and the 
dichotomization of the enemy, Bush states, “[t]hey hate what they see right here in this chamber 
– a democratically elected government.”  Through calling attention to the image laid out before 
his audience of democracy at work and by stating that “they” hate the image of American 
democracy, Bush is able to clearly distinguish between the political values of America and its 
enemy since Americans think “democracy is the best of all possible governments” (Minnick 
220).  
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Value in Crisis 
 
The final element of crisis rhetoric requires the President to present the information as if 
it is “a mark of character and honor for the American people to support the President’s decision” 
(Windt 131).  And while no specific value evocation reflects this element, the use of values as 
whole creates the effect that the audience is in line with the President.  In his aptly titled chapter 
“The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership,” David Zarefsky states 
that since Thomas Jefferson, presidents “have proved adept at construing their own interests as 
synonymous with the national interest and thereby […] standing for the whole people” (21).  By 
aligning interests, presidents are able “to suggest plausible remedies by reinterpreting shared 
beliefs and values” (22).  Therefore, by evoking values throughout their speeches, Truman and 
Bush suggest that to go against their proposal is to go against their values and their values are 
America’s values.  So not only is agreeing with the President’s plan a mark of character, but it is 
also a reaffirmation of core American values, which represent what it means to be American. 
And through the use of values, Truman and Bush ultimately create a situation that claims: to go 
against the President’s plan is to go against America.  Therefore, the incorporation of values 
throughout Truman and Bush’s speeches not only contributes to crisis creation, but also builds 
on American identity and what it means to be American.      
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IDEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS 
In addition to the common American values outlined by Minnick, there are values that 
are so ingrained in a culture that they have become what Michael Calvin McGee terms 
“ideographs.”  In his essay “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” McGee 
defines an ideograph as:  
an ordinary-language term found in political discourse.  […]  It warrants the use 
of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as 
eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily 
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (15) 
An ideograph is something in between a value and a myth; it is a one-word term or a short phrase 
that contains its own histories and connotations, and these histories and connotations run so deep 
in a culture that the word cannot be separated from its connections.  Throughout Truman and 
Bush’s speeches, each president employs ideographs to establish the ideological lines between 
good and evil, where good is freedom and evil is against freedom, much like they do with values 
and myths.  Each ideograph carries its own narratives that are evoked at a mere mention of the 
term, so the actual historical narrative does not need explication only allusion.  Similar to 
ideographs, all myths require only “some device (a quick allusion, a metaphor) to invite the 
audience’s remembrance of that tale” (Hart and Daughton 234). 
     
Freedom’s Freedom 
 
Truman and Bush both employ these ordinary-language terms in their speeches to guide 
their audiences to their intended ends.  The most prevalent ideograph that appears in both 
speeches is that of freedom.  The word “freedom” can be analyzed as an ideograph because the 
meaning of the word goes beyond mere definition.  It has its own history, its own wars that have 
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been fought in freedom’s name, and it is the narrative that freedom carries that distinguishes it 
from other terms and from values relating to freedom.   
Throughout his 18-minute speech, Truman uses the word “freedom” or derivations of it 
24 times.  Nothing is more valued in American culture than freedom and our freedoms, so by 
depicting a world where freedom itself is at stake, Truman can be sure that the American people 
will side with freedom since Americans have fought for freedom in the wars of the past, and we 
will continue to do so into the future.  At one point, Truman lists several of the freedom-values 
Americans hold: “free institutions, […] free elections, […] freedom of speech and religion, and 
freedom from political oppression.”  Each of these “freedoms” carries their own histories, and 
Truman evokes all of the beliefs associated with them through merely listing them for his 
audience.  Then he juxtaposes this way of life based on freedoms with the way of our enemies 
who practice “the suppression of personal freedoms.”  America was founded on freedoms, and to 
be against freedom is to be against America, and that is unthinkable.  Therefore, our enemies 
become evil because they do not value freedom.  Throughout his speech, Truman is not simply 
evoking the political values associated with freedom; he is also referencing the narrative of 
history that the word “freedom” carries.  
Bush uses the word “freedom” or derivations of it 13 times in his speech, and while this 
is considerably less often than Truman, the cultural significance is still immanent.  Bush refers to 
the freedom ideograph often to continually reaffirm America’s past and present commitment to 
freedom, and he is able to establish a course of action based on the threat that “freedom itself is 
under attack.”  Since the founding of this country, the intent has been on allowing freedom to 
exist, and since we have fought wars over freedom before, Bush insinuates that it is time once 
again to defend our values, to defend our way of life, to defend freedom because “we are in a 
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fight for our principles.”  Furthermore, similar to Truman, Bush juxtaposes America’s enemies 
as against freedom: “[t]hey hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, 
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”  By first stating that America’s 
enemies hate American freedoms and then outlining those freedoms, Bush creates a powerful 
link to the stakes of the war on terror since freedom and all of its derivations are the targets. 
 
Freedom’s Democracy and Justice 
 
 While the freedom ideograph is the most prominent in both speeches, Truman also 
incorporates democracy, and Bush mentions justice.  Appearing six times in the Truman 
Doctrine, “democracy” and its derivations function to evoke the political values associated with 
democracy, but also the myths and histories surrounding the term.  Democracy and freedom are 
two interconnected ideographs because their stories often reference one another.  America was 
founded on freedoms, and the democratic government is associated with maintaining these 
freedoms.  Without democracy, freedoms cannot be preserved, so democracy in a way functions 
as the keeper of freedom.  Truman draws on the connection between freedom and democracy to 
convince America to aid Greece and Turkey and to depict the ideological struggle that is facing 
the world.  Democracy is being attacked abroad, and democracy like freedom is worth fighting to 
preserve.  Therefore, when Truman states that “democratic Greece” is vulnerable and falling into 
totalitarianism, he is referencing America’s own history of democracy to persuade his audience 
to aid Greece in its struggle like other countries aided us in ours. 
 The struggle that Bush depicts is still based on ideologies, but his moves away from 
differing governments to the more vague constructions of good and evil.  Since Bush has no 
opposing government system to indicate, evoking the ideographic narrative of democracy is not a 
priority.  Instead, Bush turns to the ideograph of justice, using the term or its derivates six times 
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in the duration of his speech.  The first three times it appears is at the beginning of the speech.  
“Justice” as an ideograph evokes past narratives of wrongs being righted and the history of the 
justice system.  It is often associated with retribution as well, and Bush employs the term to bring 
to the surface all of the histories and connotations associated with it.  After the attacks of 
September 11th, Americans were grieving, and American culture often depicts grief leading to 
retribution, which is defined as justice.  Therefore, since America was grieving, Bush knew that 
the next step is the desire for justice.  By stating, “Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or 
bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done,” Bush sets up the differing connotations of 
justice.  To bring people to justice evokes the justice system, where bringing justice to people 
alludes to a more renegade form of justice that does not wait for the system to deliver justice.  
Additionally, at the end of his speech, Bush states, “justice and cruelty, have always been at war 
[…].”  By placing justice and cruelty as polar opposites, Bush claims that the attack on America 
was based on cruelty, but what America does in retaliation is righteously based on justice.  This 
dichotomy is another one of Bush’s depictions of the ideological differences between America 
and its enemies, and through using the ideograph of justice, he further establishes America on the 
side of good. 
The inclusion of ideographs allows both Truman and Bush to further delineate America 
the good from its enemies the evil.  Both presidents are able to create ideological battle lines 
through one-word terms.  According to McGee, “[a]ll communities take pains to record and 
preserve the vertical structure of their ideographs” (11).  Evidence of the preservation of freedom 
can be seen in Bush’s speech since it draws from not only the same histories that Truman did in 
his doctrine, but also from the histories that Truman and the other Cold War presidents that 
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followed established.  And the histories and the narratives that surround ideographs are what 
connect them to cultural myths. 
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MYTHIC ALLUSIONS 
 Myths are stories that narrate the events or beliefs of the past.  While similar to 
ideographs because myths have histories and narratives, a myth is more than a one-word term 
and often carries a distinct cultural memory.  Myths are stories that we tell ourselves about 
ourselves, such as the most prevalent American myth that Americans are God’s chosen people.  
Even though there are several types of myths, Truman and Bush allude to identity myths and 
eschatological myths most often in their respective speeches.  Hart and Daughton state that 
“[identity myths] explain what makes one cultural grouping different from another” (243).  The 
cultural groupings that identity myths create not only distinguish one cultural from another, but 
also allow for polarities to arise through these distinctive identities.  Truman and Bush both use 
identity myths to differentiate Americans from their enemies and set them in the binary 
opposition of good and evil.  Where identity myths describe cultural characteristics, 
“[e]schatological myths help a people know where they are going, what lies in store for them in 
the short run […] as well as the long run […]” (Hart and Daughton 243).  Both presidents depict 
futures that argue if their proposal is not carried out, the failure to act will lead to the end of 
America.  Each of these types of myths strengthens Truman and Bush’s agendas because in order 
to convince Americans to enter “cold” wars, both presidents had to identify an enemy and depict 
a future that put America at risk if their proposals were not implemented.   
Throughout the Truman Doctrine, Truman does not diverge into any specific narrations 
of myths; however, he does rely on the allusions to general American myths to create a 
distinction between America and America’s enemies.  During his presidency, Truman had 
attempted to mend tensions between America and Russia, but in the Truman Doctrine, he 
changes direction and creates communism and communists as our enemy.  He also depicts a 
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future that would lend itself to the urgency of aiding Greece and Turkey, while at the same time 
reinforce the communistic enemy.  In order to establish these grounds, Truman relies on identity 
myths, to create or label the enemy, and eschatological myths, to depict potential futures.  
Likewise, Bush has to create the image of America’s enemy, and he does so through myth 
allusion.  Americans were living in a drastically changed world after September 11th and needed 
narrative to make sense of the events, as well as the changed world. Bush incorporates both 
identity and eschatological myths to create the parameters of the world post-September 11th.  
While Bush does not specifically narrate any myths, his references to established myths creates a 
distinction between America and its enemies, as well as lays out what the future holds for 
America. 
 
Reinforcing and Differentiating Identities 
 
 In 1947, America and its allies had recently defeated the Germans and Japanese, and the 
Russians had signed the Yalta agreement, which stated that they would allow democratic 
elections.  American confidence was high.  Despite the fact that Stalin did not allow the 
democratic elections, America and the United Nations had not proceeded with any penalty for 
the Russian leader.  So two years after the war’s end, Truman had to create a critical threat of 
communist colonization and identify the sides of good and evil without evoking “hot” war 
rhetoric.  Americans were fearful of how hot war was to be fought now that atomic warfare was 
a reality, so Truman avoids any mention of military action in his proposal to reinforce that he is 
not suggesting a war, merely requesting aid. 
 The speech begins with Truman alluding to the weaknesses of Eastern European 
countries, specifically Greece: “Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of 
reconstruction.  Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance […].”  Truman 
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does not have to establish these countries as weak but simply remind his audience of their 
weaknesses because Americans have seen their struggle and already fought to defend these 
countries.  Therefore, Truman alludes to the myth of the weak Eastern countries to show that the 
struggle is not over.  Stating, “When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the 
retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, 
communications, and merchant marine” illustrates the conditions postwar.  And stating 
“economic recovery [was made] impossible” aligns the postwar conditions with the current 
conditions in 1947, stitching together the identity of Greece with its past and present 
circumstances as the same.  By aligning Greece’s wartime hardships with a continuing crisis, 
Truman awakens a myth that “provide[s] a heightened sense of continuity,” which “gives 
meaning to the present and future by making them seem continuous with the past” (Hart and 
Daughton 243).  Truman extends the myth created during World War II of a weak Europe to 
offer a familiar narrative to depict Greece’s current condition to the American public. 
 After identifying Greece as a weak country and in order to convince America to lend aid, 
Truman establishes an alliance between Greece and America to create a sense of unity.  Relying 
on the myth from the war that the allies were joined as one force fighting against evil and 
reiterating Greece’s democratic status “provide[s] a heightened sense of community” that 
Truman needs to gain support for his proposal (Hart and Daughton 244).  Additionally, Truman 
aligns Greek values with American values, referring to Greece as a “self-supporting and self-
respecting democracy,” which further alludes to the myth that democratic nations are united 
together. 
 While aligning Greece and, by extension, Turkey with America is where Truman begins 
his speech, he also alludes to identity myths for Americans.  In order to convince Americans to 
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aid Greece and Turkey, the countries have to be considered worthy of assistance.  However, in 
order for America to interfere with another country’s politics, even if it was in need of support, 
Truman had to show “a heightened sense of choice” produced “by depicting dialectical struggles 
between Good and Evil” (Hart and Daughton 244).  Americans were heroes during the war, and 
Truman incorporates the myth of Americans as the rescuers to further his claim, making it clear 
that “[t]here is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.”  America is all that is left 
to fight against communism, totalitarianism, and social unrest.  Careful to depict the British as 
drained and the United Nations as “not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required,” 
Truman outlines a grave, urgent situation that can only be improved by the involvement of 
Americans. So once again, he shows that Americans are faced with a decision, a decision to fight 
evil and come to the rescue of those who cannot defend themselves or to let Eastern Europe fall 
into the hands of democracy’s enemies.  And with the American hero allusions, Truman guides 
his audience to his intended end: aiding Greece and Turkey.   
 Referencing an established identity myth for communists was not a simple task because 
after the war ended, Truman did not address communists as our enemy.  Truman did not, until 
the Truman Doctrine, identify the struggles between communist Russia and America.  Therefore, 
when the Truman Doctrine was constructed, the myth identifying the enemy had to transcend 
from Nazis to communists.  Truman accomplished this undertaking by creating coherence, 
drawing on several established myths of evil enemies to form a conception of evil that seemingly 
has no end.  Most notably, Truman alludes to the enemy myth from World War II that depicts a 
totalitarian enemy focused on spreading its ideologies across the globe, namely Nazis.  Truman 
does not to use the word “communism” often and, in fact, it is only used once in the 18-minute 
speech.  Instead, Truman draws on references to German and Nazi destruction and the more 
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vague “enemy occupation,” “extremism,” “coercion,” “terrorist activities,” and “totalitarian 
regimes.”  By not consistently labeling America’s enemy, Truman allows a space for the creation 
of the enemy to evolve, but he is careful to stress that the enemy, whether referenced as 
communism, totalitarianism, or terrorism, is ultimately against democracy and freedom.  What is 
at stake, what is being decided is clear: good must triumph over evil, and “such grappling 
heightens the importance of the issues at stake” (Hart and Daughton 244).  And the decision to 
aid Greece and Turkey then becomes as pivotal as the decision to fight Germany and Japan in 
World War II. 
Faced with the creation of an enemy, Bush turns to identity myths to help conceptualize 
America’s new enemy in the war on terror.  In comparison to Truman, Bush was able to allude to 
enemies in America’s past to identify the enemy of America’s present.  Having a Middle Eastern 
enemy is nothing new for Americans.  Throughout history, America has battled over Middle 
Eastern countries directly and indirectly, and most recently, the Persian Gulf War established a 
distinct Arab enemy.  Considering that there was a foundation already in place for an Arab 
enemy, President Bush only had to distinguish between our direct enemies and an entire region 
and religion.  Since there was no single country to declare war on, the definition of the enemy 
had to be constructed using ideological identification, and Bush creates an ideological dichotomy 
by distinguishing what America values versus what our enemies value: “freedom and fear” 
respectively.  Bush often relies on identification by negation, stating that Americans stand for 
freedom and our enemies are against freedom since “fear” lacks the ideological power as the 
opposite of freedom.  In fact, Bush relies on vague terms such as terror, fear, evil, and murder 
because he is without a clear frame to identify the specific ideologies of the new enemy.  
Apparently, Bush, and perhaps America, lacked an ideograph that encompassed the meaning 
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behind the attack on September 11th.  Because while our American freedom is rich with 
historical meaning, neither the country nor the President has been able to identify an ideograph 
that carries enough historical weight to define America’s new enemy.  Americans are still using 
the terms Bush set up in the days following the attacks such as terror, terrorists, and fear.  
However, in the duration of this speech and the presidential speeches that followed, Bush gives 
new historical context to the term “terror” and its derivates that perhaps in 2007 could be seen as 
the dialectic opposite ideograph to freedom.   
In 2001, however, Bush was still wrestling to define the ideologies of the enemy, and he 
relies on the myth created by Truman in the Truman Doctrine of totalitarianism as the enemy of 
Americans: “[Our enemies] follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism.”  As 
many scholars have noted, Bush clearly avoids communism in this list of the “murderous 
ideologies of the 20th century” because America needed the support of communist China, in 
particular.  Instead, he pulls from the World War II historical memory myths (i.e. Nazism) to 
help align the new enemy with one that can be identified easily.  Bush also calls on Truman’s 
Cold War myth in which there was a defined ideological enemy in totalitarian regimes.   
 Since the enemy identification is mostly based on what they are not, Bush underscores 
American identity.  Therefore, the majority of identity myths used are designed to reaffirm the 
American community, as well as highlight “dialectical struggles between Good and Evil” (Hart 
and Daughton 244).  America had just suffered an attack of tragic proportions, so affirming 
American identity was vital to Bush’s agenda.  America needed reassurance of its greatness in 
this time of confusion, so Bush pushes the power of American values, and alludes to the most 
prevalent American myth of Americans as God’s chosen people.  This myth not only grounds 
American identity, but it also establishes America on the side of good.  Additionally, Bush uses 
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his formerly frequent references to the “good war” or World War II to reestablish the place of 
Americans as heroes and victors instead of victims.  Americans needed reassurance that they 
were good even though they had suffered an attack.  So Bush clarifies that America was attacked 
because it is great, and not because it is evil: “They stand against us, because we stand in their 
way.”  Bush’s clarification of why America was attack is imperative in order for America to 
remain on the good side of the Manichean world he creates. 
 
Eschatology: the End of Times 
 
 Having clear enemies assists in depicting America’s future through myths because 
distinct enemy lines lead to distinct sides of good and evil and ultimately to the victory of good.  
In 1947, America had just won a war that had distinct enemy lines, and by alluding to World 
War II, Truman is able to present future conflict along the same lines, where America knows its 
enemies and knows it will triumph over them.  In her essay on crisis rhetoric, Bonnie Dow states, 
“[a] community cannot understand fully the meaning of an event […] until it is placed within a 
context that aligns it with past experiences and the beliefs and values that govern their 
understanding of such experiences” (298).  And when Truman claims that “[o]ur victory was 
won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations,” 
he is directly confronting the narrative surrounding the victories of America in World War II to 
predict the victories of future battles or, in this case, economic endeavors.  Truman effectively 
depicts the future because if America won in the past, and the same situation confronts it now, 
America will win again.   
 While predicting the possibilities for the future, Truman additionally draws on the 
eschatological myth of nuclear annihilation, though indirectly.  Truman and the rest of the world 
had been contemplating destruction since the atomic bombs were dropped.  And in 1947, 
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Americans were exceedingly concerned about how “hot” war was to be fought now that this 
technology was obtainable.  America was still the only nation with atomic capabilities, but the 
fear existed that it would not be only America’s knowledge for long.  Therefore, the Truman 
Doctrine had to address what the world was going to be like in an atomic-capable postwar.  With 
Americans still unsure of America’s place in the world after the war, a policy was needed to lay 
the foundation for the future, and the Truman Doctrine fulfilled this need with the new foreign 
policy of containment.  The containment policy was designed to prevent the spread of 
communism throughout the world while avoiding direct military involvement with Russia.  
Therefore, the allusion to nuclear consequences is present only in its absence.  The primary 
allusion is that Truman avoids mention of military action in his request for aid.  By focusing 
primarily on economic aid, Truman avoids the hot war language of atomic, global war and 
nuclear annihilation, while at the same time evoking this feared future. By carefully depicting the 
struggle of good versus evil and identifying the sides, Truman portrays the potential 
consequences if action is not taken.  According to Truman, America is at stake in the decision to 
supply aid, and “[s]hould we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be 
far reaching to the West as well as to the East.”  Truman here is claiming that the enemy is 
coming for America, and if it does not start ensuring the safety of democracy in the East, its lack 
of action will lead to democracy’s demise in the West and the end of American freedom.  “This,” 
Truman claims, referring to aiding Greece and Turkey, “is an investment in world freedom and 
world peace,” and this investment will determine our future.  Through the grim depiction of what 
will occur if America does not give aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman alludes to eschatological 
myths of destruction not only for the Eastern countries, but America as well. 
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 After September 11th, America’s potential for destruction was pervasive.  And after nine 
days of suspended belief, America not only needed reassurance of its identity and the identity of 
the enemy, but also of what lay ahead.  Drawing upon the myths associated with World War II, 
Bush states, “Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on 
foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.”  This statement alludes to two war myths, and these 
war myths assert a “sense of authority” since they “link [America’s] preferred policies to its 
historical truths” (Hart and Daughton 243).  The first myth referenced is that Americans in the 
face of war reign victorious, and the second is that America has been attacked before at Pearl 
Harbor and sought and secured victory over its enemies.  These two war myths help to create the 
future of the new war.  Although, as Bush states several times, this is a different kind of war, the 
myths he uses allow the past to predict the future because “Americans have known wars,” and 
those wars leave Americans as the victors.   
 As for what Americans are to expect on the home front, Bush spends several minutes 
preparing us for our call of duty during this war.  Again, a parallel with World War II is present 
since during that war Americans had to adjust to and accommodate the country’s needs, and 
during this new war, Americans will have to do the same.  However, Bush only directly asks 
Americans “to live your lives, and hug your children. […] to be calm and resolute […] to uphold 
the values of America […] [and] to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your 
contributions.”  Bush’s requests represent the myth of past war participation of the American 
people, excluding World War II.  Alluding to the myth that Americans can best fight a war by 
continuing our way of life perpetuates the distance Americans often have in international 
conflict.  Bush claims, since Americans’ values were attacked, the best way to combat this war is 
by maintaining our values.  Bush’s requests of the American people alludes to the myth that 
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Americans are separate and superior to the rest of the world, which, Bush asserts, will not 
change.  These minimal requests allow this “myth [to give] meaning to the present and future by 
making them seem continuous with the past” (Hart and Daughton 243).  Americans will not 
change, we will continue with our way of life, and in doing so, we will win the war on terror.  
Overall, the President is not asking for much from the country directly.  Although, indirectly 
outlined in his speech is the insistence to allow his policies to be implemented. 
 The allusions to myths throughout both speeches create a sort of narrative out of the 
speeches themselves.  Truman and Bush are outlining what the new narrative will be for their 
time.  While Truman sets up an ideological battle myth that lasted for 44 years, Bush references 
the myth of the Cold War to create a similar battle 54 years after the Truman Doctrine.  Here 
again, the cultural continuity between the past and present is prevalent, and similar to the 
histories associated with ideographs, American cultural myths are being preserved in America’s 
presidential rhetoric and beyond.   
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FANTASY THEME CREATIONS 
Values, ideographs, and myths are all cultural features used in the Truman Doctrine and 
Bush’s September 20 speech; however, each of these cultural features combines with fantasy 
themes in the two texts.  In “An Expansion of the Rhetorical Vision Component of the Symbolic 
Convergence Theory: The Cold War Paradigm Case,” Bormann, Cragan, and Sheilds present an 
investigation in Cold War rhetoric using what they refer to as “rhetorical visions” (1).  The 
authors claim that “three streams of rhetorical consciousness characterize the life cycle of 
rhetorical visions: consciousness creating, consciousness raising, and consciousness sustaining” 
(2).  Truman and Bush’s speeches both fit the consciousness-creating phase, which “involves the 
sharing of fantasies to generate new symbolic ground for a community of people” (2). 
After World War II, Americans had many concerns regarding atomic power and 
America’s postwar position in the world, and Bormann, Cragan, and Sheilds argue that three 
distinctive rhetorical visions arose to approach the questions and fears of Americans.  They claim 
that the “three transitory rhetorical visions – One World, Power Politics, and Red Fascism – at 
first competed and then partially fused, […] to explain the rapidly changing events at the end of 
the war” (2).  By 1947, in the Truman Doctrine, each rhetorical vision was present in political 
discourse, but during Truman’s speech, Bormann, Cragan, and Shields argue that all three 
visions were used in combination to form one rhetorical vision for the Cold War.  Through the 
combination of the transitory visions, Truman is able to create a singular vision that aids in 
conceptualizing the times.   
Following the events of September 11th, America was unsure of the security it once 
thought to be impenetrable.  A rhetorical vision that combined America’s fantasies into a unified 
vision was needed; America was once again in a time of consciousness creation.  Although their 
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study involves Cold War rhetoric, the three rhetorical visions Bormann, Cragan, and Shields 
discuss for the consciousness-creating phase can be applied to the Bush speech as well.  The 
application of the Cold War visions to the war on terror helps to demonstrate that the war on 
terror, as defined in the September 20 speech, is a return to the rhetorical power that emanated 
during the Cold War.  Furthermore, Bush structures the war on terror rhetoric in the September 
20 speech much in the same way Truman structures Cold War rhetoric in the Truman Doctrine.  
Eleven years after the declared end of the Cold War, Americans were faced with a return to a 
rhetorical vision created in 1947.  
  
United We Stand 
 
 The first rhetorical vision that Bormann, Cragan, and Shields provide is what they call 
One World.  In the One World rhetorical vision, “the victorious allies [were portrayed] as 
working together in times of peace as they had in times of war” (4). 
The inclusion of the One World rhetorical vision in the Truman Doctrine begins general, but 
becomes more specific to the type of countries that belong in this one world.  In the beginning of 
his speech, Truman states, “The gravity of the situation […] confronts the world today […].”  
Insinuating that the situation is the world’s problem is inclusive, but just a few lines later, 
Truman becomes more specific when he declares that situation involves Greece’s future 
“[survival] as a free nation.”  These two statements are at once joining and separating the world, 
appealing to the American fantasy of the One World vision and one free world.  Because the One 
World vision existed and was desired, Truman incorporates the language necessary to depict 
such a world, but he also creates alterations to the vision by starting to delineate which countries 
are in fact America’s allies.  When Truman states that “[t]he very existence of the Greek state is 
today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists,” 
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he is clearly separating Russia from our list of allies.  And he continues to build on this 
separation by repeatedly referring to Greece as a free and democratic nation.     
Truman incorporates the One World vision to create an American desire to aid Greece 
and Turkey because if there is a community of nations, members of that community should help 
each other.  Therefore, each time Truman mentions that “the Greek Government has asked for 
our aid […],” he is reminding his audience of the community bond, the One World that works 
together.  In the creation of the One World as a democratic, free world, Truman addresses the 
fact that Britain had been aiding Greece, but is no longer able to do so, which also grounds the 
community of nations working together.  Truman states, “[t]he British Government, which has 
been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid […].”  By informing the 
audience that Britain was aiding to Greece and can no loner afford to continue, Truman returns 
to the vision of the allies working together as they did during World War II.  America helped 
Britain during the war, and Truman claims the time has come to do so again.  The continuity of 
wartime aid and postwar aid draws from the One World vision, but the focus on democratic, free 
nations limits that vision and begins to construct the creation of the one rhetorical vision that 
encompasses the three visions that were battling for dominance previous to Truman’s speech.   
Since the end of the Cold War and the end of America’s diabolical enemy, the vision of 
One World seemed almost achievable.  Despite the military actions between the end of the Cold 
War and September 11th, Americans saw the spread of democracy throughout what was once the 
USSR and saw the allied forces working together to keep people around the world safe.  While 
the above depiction is idealistic, it reflects the idealistic rhetoric of the One World vision, 
“[portraying] the […] allies as working together […] [establishing] a world government and the 
machinery to deal with international disputes” (Bormann, Cragan, and Shields 4).  Bush uses the 
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idealistic vision of One World during two sections of his speech.  First, he incorporates the One 
World rhetorical vision in order to show that America is not alone during its time of need, and 
then Bush uses the vision to establish the sides of the new war.  Similar to Truman before him, 
Bush aims to construct One World united and divided at the same time.   
However, before drawing the line between America and those who are against America, 
Bush uses the One World rhetoric to build American confidence and to show that we have allies 
across the globe that support us: “We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in 
Australia and Africa and Latin America.”  America needs to believe that it is not alone and, most 
importantly, that it is still regarded as a great, if not the greatest nation.  Therefore, by depicting 
the countries that have mourned for American losses, Bush reassures his audience that America 
is revered by other nations.   
In addition to strengthening American confidence, Bush also reminds his audience that 
Americans were not the only people who died in the attacks.  Bush states, “Nor will we forget 
the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own.”  By claiming that Americans will not 
forget the people from other countries that died, Bush insinuates that other countries should not 
and, perhaps, will not forget about Americans.  Furthermore, he is reminding the audience that 
this tragedy affected the world, not just America, and the world, according to Bush, will respond 
together, reaffirming the One World rhetorical vision.   
 Once the community of sufferers has been established in the beginning of the speech, 
Bush does not return to the One World rhetorical vision until after the demands of the Taliban 
have been made, and the grounds for the new war have been outlined.  Returning to One World 
rhetoric after the lines have been drawn connects America’s new war with the rest of the world.  
Stating, “[t]his is not, however, just America’s fight.  And what is at stake is not just America’s 
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freedom.  This is the world’s fight.  This is civilization’s fight.  This is the fight of all who 
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom,” grounds this new war as a world-wide 
event much like that of the Cold War with those who value freedom on one side and those who 
oppose it on the other.  Americans have seen this sort of struggle before, so Bush uses the One 
World on the side of freedom that was established during the Cold War to show Americans that 
freedom will prevail once again.   Referencing the NATO charter, Bush states, “An attack on one 
is an attack on all.”  Again, he is reaffirming the One World that has been threatened and will 
join together.   
 At the same time Bush is establishing his One World rhetorical vision, he is also 
maintaining that America will not wait for support before acting.  While he states, “We ask every 
nation to join us,” he does not state that America will look to our allies for advice.  Evidence that 
a course has been set is present throughout the speech and “[e]ither you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists.”  Relying on the One World vision allows Bush to reassure America that it is 
not suffering without support, while at the same time establishing sides for this battle with 
America leading the charge.  Bush is depicting a vision of One World coming together to fight a 
mutual enemy, but not specifically declaring any alliances. 
 
Powerful Politics 
  
Throughout the employment of the One World rhetorical vision in the Truman Doctrine 
and Bush’s speech, the unification of the Power Politics rhetorical vision is evident.  Both 
presidents incorporate the vision of One World, yet they both subdivide that One World into free 
countries joined against either totalitarian or terrorist doctrines.  The divisions that Truman and 
Bush create allow for the merger of the One World and Power Politics rhetorical visions.  The 
rhetorical vision of Power Politics, according to Bormann, Cragan, and Shields, “depicted a 
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world of competing nation states that worked in terms of their own self-interest” (5).  The vision 
is reminiscent of the American isolationist foreign policy held previous to America’s entrance 
into World War II, but the vision is altered to fit more with the policy for containment that 
Truman creates in the Truman Doctrine.  America’s willingness to aid a foreign country would 
not work with the policy of isolationism, so Truman returns to the focus of American self-
interest extending beyond the borders of the United States.  Additionally, Truman depicts an 
enemy working for their own self-interest to create the motivation for Americans to adopt a 
policy of containment and preservation.    
As the Truman Doctrine progresses, Truman moves from a united world to united 
democratic nations battling any country that attempts to stunt the practice of democracy, which 
extends the rhetorical vision to include Power Politics.  As mentioned above, even when Truman 
is evoking the One World vision, he additionally reinforces the language of freedom and 
democracy.  By using descriptive language, Truman is able to show distinctions in the world and 
gradually create the blending of One World and Power Politics. The power of America then 
becomes its ability to aid countries in maintaining their freedom, creating one free world versus 
enemies of freedom.  
 Once the world is divided, Truman stresses the urgency and gravity of the situation: “At 
the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways 
of life. The choice is too often not a free one.”  The immediacy that Truman creates, along with 
depicting the ways of life as free or not free lay the foundation for the motivation behind 
defending America’s self-interest, which now includes all democratic, free countries.  Truman 
continues to define the ways of life as a democratic, free way of life versus one based on “terror 
and oppression […], and the suppression of personal freedoms” to further ground the need to 
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adopt a foreign policy of containment before the totalitarian regimes rid the world of freedom.  
Then he reaffirms the one free world’s need to declare its dominance by stating, “it must be the 
policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
[…].”  America, Truman claims, is in a power struggle fighting for the survival of democracy 
and cannot risk defeat.  America now needs to fight for its own self-interest, which includes the 
maintenance of democracy throughout the world. 
    With the lack of the One World rhetorical vision linking America’s decision making to its 
allies, Bush creates room to include the rhetoric of Power Politics.  Since America was attacked 
on September 11th, Bush can easily place America’s response in terms of its own self-interest.  
“Our nation,” Bush states, “has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack.  We will 
take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans.”  America had foreign policies 
that focused on its own self-interest prior to Bush’s speech, so Bush did not have to spend as 
much time as Truman in justifying his policy.  Where Truman was suggesting a new form of 
foreign policy, Bush suggests a return to a containment-esque foreign policy that has America 
maintaining freedom by containing the spread of terrorism through the elimination of the 
terrorists.   
 The terrorist intentions outlined in the speech elevate the potency in Bush’s use of the 
Power Politics rhetorical vision.  Bush does not attempt to convince Americans to act in their 
own self-interest as much as he depicts the terrorists acting in their interests.  The terrorists, 
according to Bush, have as their goals “remaking the world – and imposing [their] radical beliefs 
on people everywhere.”  The language Bush uses here is indicative of the Power Politics vision, 
showing a group of people acting in their own self-interests, and this depiction provides Bush 
with the opportunity to build on the motivation for America to defend its self-interest. 
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Fear and Fascists 
     
Both the One World and Power Politics rhetorical visions incorporated in Truman and 
Bush’s speeches work to create the merging of the Red Fascism vision.  Bormann, Cragan, and 
Shields explain that “[t]he rhetorical vision of Red Fascism portrayed a monumental struggle 
between good and evil” (6).  Throughout both speeches in the analysis of values, ideographs, and 
myths, the lines between good and evil are being drawn, and the depiction of good versus evil 
culminates in the rhetorical vision of Red Fascism.  Where in the Power Politics vision Truman 
creates opposition, he maintains a community with his inclusion of One World rhetoric, then he 
adds the Red Fascism rhetorical vision, building an enemy that is evil and “characterized […] as 
international, monolithic, godless communism” (Bormann 6).  The Red Fascism rhetorical vision 
employs an us-versus-them outlook and creates exigence that the other two visions lack on their 
own.  
Halfway through his speech, Truman begins to incorporate the rhetoric of Red Fascism.  
Once he starts employing this rhetorical vision it becomes the guiding force for the remainder of 
the speech, setting up a depiction of the world with the free nations in opposition to the evil 
totalitarian nations.  Truman states: 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free 
institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual 
liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.  
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon 
the majority.  It relies on terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. 
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The above depiction shows the division between what is good and what is evil, and the 
incorporation of American values and the “freedom” ideograph reinforces the “goodness” of 
America.  Furthermore, the corresponding differences between the two ways of life establish 
clear distinctions between what is good and what is evil beyond the governing systems of 
democracy and totalitarianism. 
 While the phrasing of Red Fascism clearly refers to the red scare during the Cold War, 
the same vision can be seen in Bush’s speech, but instead of communism, terrorism is depicted 
as the villainous ideology threatening freedom.  The first time Bush refers to the people 
responsible for September 11th, he labels them “enemies of freedom.”  By referring to the 
attackers in ideological terms, Bush is able to return to the Red Fascism rhetorical vision of the 
Cold War where democracy and communism are depicted as ideological enemies.   
Bush’s Red Fascism rhetoric is exemplified when labeling the enemies and the enemies’ 
tactics.  Claiming that the enemies “plot evil” and “commit evil” grounds the enemies’ actions as 
explicitly evil.  However, elsewhere Bush’s descriptions merely evoke evil.  He states that the 
enemies are “threatening people everywhere,” and that they create “a dark threat of violence.”  
However, Bush counters the evilness of our enemies with the goodness of America because 
Americans, “assured of the rightness of our cause” and with God on our side, will defeat evil.     
In order to construct the enemies as evil, Bush must not only make their actions evil, but 
the enemies themselves must also be evil.  Therefore, Bush uses several labels that are intended 
to evoke evil.  One of the clearest examples of Red Fascism rhetoric in the speech occurs when 
Bush refers to America’s enemies as “murderers.” By labeling our enemies murders, Bush 
indicates that the acts committed by the enemies are murder.  Murder is against the law in the 
United States, and in the Bible, one of the Ten Commandments states not to commit murder.  
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Significantly, the Koran also forbids murder.  These factors contribute to the portrayal of 
America’s enemies as evil and allude to consequences of evil acts.  If people commit murder, 
they are punished by America and by God or Allah, and this connection continues to reinforce 
Bush’s claim that God is with America.  Extending the enemies farther from God and good, 
Bush states, “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith […].”  By labeling the enemies 
“traitors,” Bush is able to broaden his argument past divisions in religious beliefs to the 
unequivocal divide of good and evil. 
 Throughout both speeches, Truman and Bush employ the three rhetorical visions with 
alterations in order to create one guiding rhetorical vision for the Cold War and the war on terror 
respectively.  By incorporating elements of all three visions, the presidents were able to 
“generate new symbolic ground for [Americans]” to share, which in turn created the 
consciousness to conceptualize the changing world in 1947 and 2001 (Bormann, Cragan, and 
Shields 2).  Rhetorical visions combine with and enhance the power of cultural approaches to 
create a consciousness that defined the times of Truman and Bush.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The Truman Doctrine laid the foundation for Cold War rhetoric that lasted for 44 years 
and influenced George W. Bush’s response to September 11th.  President Bush’s address given 
on September 20th parallels the Truman Doctrine, and through cultural critique these similarities 
emerge and display how the policies created in the Truman Doctrine informed Bush’s speech 54 
years later.  
 Through value analysis, the connection between what Americans value and the three 
elements of Windt’s crisis rhetoric is highlighted.  Minnick’s theoretic value that states, 
“[Americans] express a desire to reasonable, to get the facts and make rational choices” (218), 
directly relates to the first element of crisis rhetoric.  Windt claims that the first element requires 
that the President assert “control over the facts of the situation and [acknowledge] that the New 
Facts which occasion the speech constitute a New Situation – a crisis for the United States” 
(128).  In order to create crisis, Truman and Bush assert knowledge of the facts, and in order to 
appeal to American values, they outline those facts for the American public.  The creation 
element occurs because the President “understands the New Situation better than anyone else” 
and can, therefore, make the most informed, well-reasoned decision (128).  
 The second element of Windt’s crisis rhetoric states that the President “introduce[s] a 
devil-angel interpretation into the narration of facts.  The enemy is duplistic and secretive; the 
United States is open and trusting” (129). Through the incorporation of economic, social, 
religious, and political values, Truman and Bush outline the ideological differences between 
America and its new enemies.  The economic values both presidents employ aid in reinforcing 
American identity and function to reaffirm America’s successes, while the social values used 
accentuate Americans as upfront and honest people.  The economic and social values contribute 
 61
to the second element of crisis rhetoric, yet the religious and political values the presidents evoke 
more extensively build the context for a situation in which “ideological angels do mortal and 
moral combat with ideological devils” (129).  For Bush the most significant depiction of 
America as good and with God occurs in his allusions to religious values.  He sets up a moral 
situation since according to Minnick, “[Americans] tend to judge people and events 
moralistically,” and Bush situates America on the side of good (220).  Truman relies more 
heavily on political values to distinguish America from its evil enemies.  Considering that 
“[Americans] think American democracy is the best of all possible governments,” Truman 
juxtaposes democracy with totalitarian governments to ground the ideological conflict he depicts 
(220). 
 The incorporation of value-evoking content in presidential rhetoric contributes to Windt’s 
final element of crisis rhetoric, which states that the President needs to present the information as 
if it is “a mark of character and honor for the American people to support the President’s 
decision” (131).  Presidential interests align with the country’s interests, so by evoking values 
throughout their speeches, Truman and Bush establish proposals that reaffirm core American 
values, which also builds on American identity.      
         Ideograph analysis further distinguishes America the good from its enemies the evil, as 
well as reinforces core American values and myths.  Through the repetition of the freedom 
ideograph, Truman and Bush repeatedly allude to the history and affection for freedom.  And by 
claiming that America’s new enemies are opposed to freedom, both presidents further establish 
the ideological battle lines.  
 The inclusion of identity myths deepens the depiction of the ideological differences 
between America and its new enemies.  Using identity myths, both presidents reaffirm America 
 62
as the good and as the victorious and juxtapose the enemy as sinister, evil, and ultimately 
doomed to failure.  However, the eschatological myths Truman and Bush allude to reinforce the 
first element of crisis rhetoric, in which the President asserts control over the situation (Windt 
128).  Referring to doctrines depicting the end of times, eschatological myths illustrate possible 
futures.  Truman and Bush assert their control over the situations by narrating bleak, detrimental 
futures if America does not proceed with their plans and difficult but rewarding futures if their 
plans are implemented.        
The use of values, ideographs, and myths contributes to crisis creation; however, they 
contribute to consciousness creation as well.  Exploring the rhetorical vision component in 
fantasy theme analysis expounds upon all three elements of crisis rhetoric and underscores the 
one vision that leads to the creation of a new consciousness.  Truman and Bush employ three 
rhetorical visions to create a new, singular vision that connects the three together.  Each of the 
three rhetorical visions calls upon values, ideographs, and myths: The One World vision creates 
a community that has the same beliefs; the Power Politics vision depicts the community from the 
One World vision battling for the continuation of its interests; and the Red Fascism vision 
elevates the struggle between good and evil, drawing from the One World vision as the good 
community and from the successes of the Power Politics vision.  In establishing this connection, 
both of the presidents were able to “generate new symbolic ground for [Americans]” to share 
(Bormann, Cragan, and Shields 2).   
The combination of cultural criticism and the genre of crisis rhetoric underscore the 
creation qualities of these two speeches and begin to show how rhetorical elements function 
together and inform one another.  To study these speeches through crisis rhetoric or cultural 
criticism alone would only begin to uncover the complexities involved in crisis creation and the 
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incorporation of cultural elements.  However, by joining the two approaches, not only does the 
way in which crisis is created become clear, but also the means by which a crisis is successfully 
created through influencing consciousness.   
Because of their policy foundation qualities, the Truman Doctrine and Bush’s September 
20 speech function within the consciousness-creating and crisis-creating approaches; however, it 
would be interesting to see how these two presidents moved through the other consciousness 
phases: raising and sustaining.  Truman and Bush established their foreign policies and carried 
out their immediate agendas in the speeches I examine, but a few years after each of these 
presidents’ speeches, they initiated hot wars in Korea and Iraq respectively.  Some scholars have 
noted that within the rhetoric of Bush’s September 20 speech is the language that aided in 
justifying the war in Iraq.  Therefore, investigations of both Bush and Truman’s rhetoric 
following the creation phase to look for similar patterns may prove fruitful, not only in making 
connections between the two presidents, but also in relating the speeches from consciousness and 
crisis creation to the sustaining of them both.  Further research is needed in this area. 
While the extent of Truman’s creation rhetoric can be seen throughout the Cold War 
presidential rhetoric that followed, the lasting influence of Bush’s rhetorical creation has not yet 
been tested on another president.  Transforming or sustaining the consciousness that Bush 
created on September 20, 2001, could be difficult; however, America will have to wait until 2008 
and beyond to see how our next president defines the war on terror.   
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